Competition in hospital services has been fostered in an increasing number of OECD countries with the goal that hospitals improve quality and/or efficiency. With the same intention competition has been promoted in Germany when introducing a system of prospective payments based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) in 2003. Beyond its intended effects, however, the reform led to a substantial increase in hospital activity, particularly for orthopaedic surgery. To shed more light on these developments, this paper analyses the relationship between the rates of certain orthopaedic surgical procedures and hospital competition across and within each of Germany's 402 districts. We measured competition with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on market shares for hip replacements, knee replacements and spine surgeries. Using spatial panel regression, which allows for spatial dependency and unobserved individual heterogeneity, we found that the rate of hip and knee replacements rose as market concentration increased. A potential explanation might be that hospitals specialize in these particular procedures.
Introduction
Competition in hospital services has been fostered in an increasing number in OECD countries. The Netherlands, the United States and the United Kingdom had a leading role but many other countries followed in promoting competition, e.g. by enhancing patient's choice. Motivated by increasing health care expenditures, the desired effects of fostering competition in the hospital sector are that hospitals improve quality and/ or efficiency [1] . This is based on economic theory stating that competition between hospitals increases quality under administered prices (if prices are above marginal costs) [2] and empirical evidence which comes to the result that competition reduces costs, increases efficiency and improves quality [3] [4] [5] . 1 With the same intention competition has been promoted in Germany when introducing a prospective system of hospital payment based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) in 2003 [6, 7] . Competition was thought to, for example, incentivize hospitals to provide higher quality to attract more patients [8] . However, beyond those intended effects of the DRG introduction, there has been a stark rise in the volume of hospital cases. Several studies have shown that hospital activity increased between 8% and 9% from 2005 to 2010 [9, 10] , with varying rates at district level [11] [12] [13] . Moreover, Germany has the highest rates of several surgical procedures compared to all other OECD countries [14] . These findings suggest that besides medical need, the (economic) interest of the hospitals may be a determinant of the trend toward increased hospital activity.
Several strategies for a hospital to increase the number of patients are discussed in the literature. This includes among others: admitting patients for unnecessary services, and providing services that could have been provided in an outpatient setting [8] . A potential explanation for the increase in volume of services for which there has been no medical need or justification is given by the theory of information asymmetry by Arrow [15] . According to Arrow, patients lack the educational background in medicine and can therefore not evaluate the physician's medical decision. The theory of supply induced demand builds up on that, stating that physicians, who have more information on diagnostic and possible treatment, can influence the demand of the patient [16] . Several studies could show that this theory can be applied to the hospital setting [17, 18] . The incentive to increase hospital services, however, depends on the reimbursement system. Under a prospective payment system as the DRG reimbursement, not all cases are attractive for the hospital. Following Ellis and McGuire [19] , competitive pressure will incentivize the hospitals to attract only those cases where the reimbursement through the prospective payment is higher than the costs.
Several studies have analysed the relationship between competition and inpatient admissions so far. Using data from the Annual Survey of the American Hospital Association, Robinson and Luft [20] got to the conclusion that a competitive environment was associated with a higher number of admissions per year. Two reports have examined hospital cases in Germany investigating the impact of competition on volume. Lüngen and Büscher [21] found a positive association between the number of cases and competition while Augurzky et al. [9] were unable to observe a significant association between the two variables. However, these studies analysed the impact of competition on all hospital admissions. They did not focus on procedures with high profit margins and therefore cases which presumably stabilize the hospital's budget. This makes it difficult to pinpoint the impact of competition, which may affect the rates of only certain procedures (for example, those for which an increase in volume and predictable profit margins are possible). Furthermore, the two German studies used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure competition among hospitals, but in doing so they considered only individual hospitals rather than taking account of the hospital groups to which these hospitals may have belonged. This is an important shortcoming considering that the number of mergers and acquisitions in Germany has increased since the implementation of DRGbased payments, with the aim of reducing costs and creating synergy effects [6, 22] . These developments have had an impact on patient choice and therefore also on competition in the market for hospital services. Finally, only Augurzky et al. [9] took account of time and space using a panel model. However, the authors did not control for spatial dependence, which describes that observations that are near one another are correlated [23] . According to Skinner, this methodological shortcoming is present in most of the existing literature on regional variation [24] .
Based on the developments in Germany, the theoretical approaches and the presented studies, this study analysed the effect of fostered competition on the hospital activity. We focused on orthopaedic surgeries as musculoskeletal diseases have with 18.1% the highest revenue shares and contribute with 26% the largest share to the overall increase of case mix points [9, 25] . The relationship between hospital competition and the rates of certain orthopaedic procedures was examined using a spatial panel model which enabled us to control for spatial dependency and individual heterogeneity, and to calculate indirect effects representing the spatial effect of explanatory variables. We measured competition using the HHI, which we calculated separately for each surgical procedure while taking into account the presence of hospital groups. Based on the theory and studies presented above, we hypothesized that the age-and sex-standardized rates of surgical procedures are positively associated with the degree of competition for these procedures. We conducted the analysis at the level of the 402 districts in Germany. The study is based on data from the German DRG Statistics database, which draws on an annual census conducted throughout the country.
Methodology

Data
(1) Dependent variable The dependent variable was the number of hip replacements, knee replacements or spine surgeries per 100,000 population at a district level for the years 2006 through 2011. We obtained the data from the DRG Statistics database [49] , which provides information on treated cases and patients' socioeconomic characteristics. Using this information, we calculated the directly age-and sex-standardized surgery rates for the three procedures in each of the 402 districts in Germany for each year in the dataset. Because we wanted to focus primarily on elective surgery, we excluded all cases with the primary diagnosis of fracture.
2 Table 1 gives information on the Operation and Procedure Codes (OPS; that is, the German modification of the International Classification of Procedures in Medicine), the mean, the coefficient of variation (CV) and the growth rate of the procedures, indicating that spine surgery was associated with the greatest increase and variation among the three procedures considered in our analysis.
(2) Hospital market competition The question of how best to assess market concentration and power in the hospital sector is complex and a matter of controversy in the literature. Unlike in the United States or the Netherlands, there has been little debate on the topic in Germany [16] . However, as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) reflects the number and size distribution of firms in a market, as well as the concentration of output, it is commonly used to assess the degree of market concentration [26] . An advantage of the HHI is that it takes the relative size of competitors into account. When determining the HHI, the relevant market must be defined [27] . Following the approach taken by Motta [27] , we differentiated between the product market and the geographic market. We defined the product market as the number of hip replacements, knee replacements and spine surgeries performed by each hospital in the period 2006 through 2011. 3 This information can be found in the hospital quality reports (Strukturierte Qualitätsberichte), which licensed hospitals in Germany have been required to publish every two years since 2005. 4 Furthermore, we defined the geographic market as the district in which each hospital was located. This led to the following equation:
where IT th is the number of hip replacements, knee replacements or spine surgeries per hospital h in year t, and n the number of hospitals in German district i. HHI it can be interpreted as the sum of the squared market share of all hospitals in one district. A large HHI it indicates a greater degree of market concentration and, therefore, less competition [28] . We calculated the indices for each German district for the Following the approach of Schmid and Ulrich [29] , we took the presence of hospital groups into account, as these can be assumed to have an impact on competition in any given market. Furthermore, hospitals operating as one business unit as part of a hospital group will have a joint profit maximization strategy. Therefore, we chose to treat hospitals within a group as one entity. To identify such groups, we used the hospital quality reports, as these allow hospitals to provide information on their ownership and any group membership. However, as this information is captured by an open-ended question and could therefore lead to ambiguous identifiers, we additionally considered online sources of information, such as hospital websites [29] . Based on the information collected in this manner, we assigned one hospital group ID to each hospital. Based on this ID, the sum of the number of hip and knee replacements and spine surgeries was created by hospital group and within one district. Those sums were then used for the calculation of the HHI.
As an additional variable for competition, we included the number of hospitals in each district. Our reasoning for this was as follows: if a hypothetical district has one hospital with a very large number of inpatient treatments and numerous hospitals with a very small number of inpatient treatments, the HHI it will be close to 1. In such a case, however, the HHI will not reflect the number of hospitals, which is high. The number of hospitals acts as an additional variable for competition as it represents the number of competitors in the market. Therefore, we expect, in line with the argumentation for the HHI, a positive association between the number of hospitals and rates of orthopaedic surgery. The number of hospitals in each district was determined using the German Hospital Directory (Krankenhausverzeichnis), which is provided by the German Federal Statistical Office.
(3)
Covariates Based on the literature examining trends and regional variation in the rates of (orthopaedic) surgery, 3 A list of all OPS codes considered in our analysis can be found in Table 8 in the Online appendix. 4 The licensing of hospitals is regulated by Section 108 SGB V. If a hospital is licensed, it means that statutory health insurers absorb the costs of inpatient treatment for those patients who have statutory health insurance.
we additionally controlled for variables related to the supply of health resources and population health needs at the district level. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for those variables.
The supply of health resources is represented by a set of variables that take account of the inpatient and outpatient sectors. For the inpatient sector, we chose three variables: the density of orthopaedic beds, a dummy variable for specialized centres, the investment ratio for hospitals, and the ownership of the hospital. Following Judge et al. [30] , Lüngen und Büscher [21] , we included the density of the orthopaedic beds (number orthopaedic beds in a given hospital per 100,000 population). This served as a proxy variable for the size of the hospital's orthopaedic department. We assumed a positive association between the density of orthopaedic beds and rates of orthopaedic surgery because a larger department may represent better access to care and shorter waiting lists. The data were obtained from Federal Statistical Office's hospital statistic. For spine surgery, we took the presence of a spine centre (a specialized department) into account. As our data were at the level of patient residence, we expected that patients who lived in a district with such a centre would take advantage of the supply. Hospital financing in Germany is divided into two areas: Operational costs are covered by both statutory and private health insurers through DRG reimbursement. However, the capital cost of building or maintaining the hospital estate and other fixed assets is financed, regardless of hospital ownership type, from the individual budgets of the 16 states, among which there are enormous differences in the level of investment [7] . For hospitals in states with low levels of investment, a potential way to compensate is to increase the number of inpatient treatments. Therefore, we included as a covariate the investment ratio, which we calculated as the quotient of investments from a given state budget and the adjusted costs of the hospitals in that state [31] . We obtained data on capital investments from the webpage of the German Hospital Federation, and data on the adjusted costs of hospitals from the webpage of the Health Monitoring System of the German federal government. Following Augurzky et al. [9] and Lüngen and Büscher [21] , we additionally took account of the ownership of the hospitals on district level. Therefore, we calculated the percentage of private, public and non-for-profit hospitals in the given district. The data were obtained from the hospital quality reports.
To represent the supply of health resources in the outpatient sector, we chose the density of general practitioners and office-based orthopaedists (number of physicians per 100,000 population). Office-based orthopaedists can refer their patients to hospital and therefore have a direct impact on the number of inpatient cases. Following Schäfer et al. [32] , we expected a negative association between the density of office-based orthopaedists and rates of orthopaedic surgery, as such orthopaedists may recommend alternative ambulatory treatment. The density of general practitioners was employed as a variable to describe how well-developed health services were in a given region. The data were provided by the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning [50] . We used several variables to control for the health needs of the population. The main variable was the age-standardized prevalence of diagnosed hip arthritis, knee arthritis and diseases of the spine and back per 100,000 population, classified according to 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) 6 . Arthritis of the hip or knee is one of the main reasons for a patient to undergo joint replacement [32] . Similarly, diseases of the spine and the back capture most of the potential triggers of spine surgery. Data on the prevalence of diagnosed cases of these diseases were obtained from the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians in Germany. However, ICD codes cannot capture undiagnosed morbidity. To address this shortcoming, we controlled for risk factors of orthopaedic diseases, the health status measured by the life expectancy, and for the socioeconomic environment. The socioeconomic status is an important determinant of health [33] . Following Joines et al. [34] and Hawker et al. [35] , we used the household income as a proxy variable for morbidity. Additionally, we took account of the percentage of employees without vocational training. Employees without vocational training are likely to perform hard physical work resulting, for example, in knee or back pain [36, 37] . The data for household income, life expectancy and for employees with vocational training were provided by the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning [50] .
Analysis
We analysed the relationship between (a) the rate of hip replacements, knee replacements and spine surgeries and (b) competition as measured by the HHI while taking into account time and space. Space was defined by the 402 German districts, and the period considered in our analysis was 2006 through 2011. We conducted a Hausman test to determine whether the random or fixed effects model would be appropriate, the result of which indicated that the fixed effects model was the one to be preferred. This model, however, is associated with information loss, as it is not possible to estimate the effect for time-invariant variables, such as the number of specialized centres in a district, or the between effect (that is, the change between the individuals). One way to avoid this trade-off between efficiency and bias is to use the Mundlak model [38] , which incorporates an additional term for all time-variant variables to control for the between effect. This term is the average over time for all time-variant variables. Following Snijders and Boskers [39] , the Mundlak model can be rearranged so that the within effect and the between effect are clearly separated, resulting in the following equation:
where X it is the vector of all time-variant variables in district i and year t. Z i denotes a vector of all time-invariant variables, u i is the unobserved individual and time-invariant effect, and it is the random error term.
To check for spatial dependence, we displayed the geographic distribution of the surgery rates. The degree of spatial autocorrelation was measured using the Moran's I statistic. A significant Moran's I indicates a global correlation of the surgery rate in a given district with the surgery rates in neighbouring districts [23] . To calculate the Moran's I and for the subsequent regression analysis, a weight matrix is needed. The weighting can be applied to variables such as neighbourhood or distance. The former would be represented by a binary matrix, where w ij = 1 if the districts i and j are neighbours and w ij = 0 if not. The latter would be shown in a distance matrix that contains the distance from one district to all other districts in car minutes. The inverse of the matrix is calculated to give more weight to neighbouring districts. Both matrices, binary and distance, are row standardized. Following Elhorst [40] , we conducted our analysis using both matrices and selected the matrix that exhibited the highest log-likelihood function value.
Spatial dependence can be incorporated in two ways. One way is to include a spatially lagged variable of the dependent variable (spatial lag model) or an explanatory variable (SLX model). In such a case, the dependent variable for one district would be affected by the dependent/explanatory variable for the other districts. A possible explanation might be spillover effects caused, for example, by communication between physicians. The second way is to account for spatial autocorrelation in the error term arising from omitted variable bias (spatial error model). Spatial clustering of unobserved morbidity might be an explanation. Ignoring spatial autocorrelation in the error term results in inefficient estimations and incorrectly calculated standard errors, whereas ignoring spatial autocorrelation in the dependent/explanatory variable leads to unbiased coefficients [41] .
Following LeSage and Pace [42] , we conducted a spatial Durbin model (SDM) to decide between the two models. The advantages of the SDM are that it produces unbiased (2)
coefficients even if the true data generation process is a spatial error or lag model, and that it generalizes both model types 7 :
We used the Wald test to test the two hypotheses H 0 ∶ = 0 and H 1 ∶ + = 0 , whereby the first examines whether the SDM can be simplified to a spatial lag model and the second whether it can be simplified to a spatial error model. If both hypotheses are rejected, the SDM best describes the data.
Bringing the rearranged Mundlak model and the SDM together, our final model is represented by the following equation:
We created all of our maps using ArcMap Version 10.1. Our statistical analysis was performed using Stata Version 12.
Results
The age-standardized rates for the three surgical procedures considered in our study are mapped in Fig. 1 . The maps show regional clustering for all three procedures. For hip and knee replacement, we observed similar patterns, with low rates seen in the eastern parts of Germany and high rates in Bavaria and the north-west. For spine surgery, Schleswig-Holstein and the eastern parts of Bavaria were characterized by high rates and Saxony by low rates.
As seen in Table 3 , the Moran's I was positive and significant for all three procedures and for all 6 years. Figure 2 maps the HHI for all three procedures. Horizontal lines indicate that a district did not have any hospitals that performed the procedure in question during the study period. Following the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice, an HHI below 1500 indicates an unconcentrated market, an HHI between 1500 and 2500 a moderately concentrated market, and an HHI above 2500 a highly concentrated market [43] . The maps suggest a high level of competition in big cities such as Berlin, Hannover, Bremen and Munich, as well as in the Ruhr area. They also generally indicate higher levels of competition for hip and knee replacement than for spine surgery. Moreover, the number of districts lacking hospitals that performed spine surgery was greater than that of districts lacking hospitals that performed hip or knee replacement. Comparing the maps for the HHI with and without hospital groups showed that the inclusion of hospital groups decreases the level of competition as the number of hip and knee replacements and spine surgeries are distributed to fewer providers if a hospital group exists in the district. However, we observed the same tendencies-high levels in cities and the Ruhr area. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results of the panel regression and the SDM, as the result of the Wald test had indicated that the SDM was the preferred model. The results of the SDM are divided into a direct and an indirect effect, where the direct effect represents the effect in a given district and the indirect effect represents the effect of variables (for example, the HHI) in all neighbouring districts on the surgery rates in that district. The indirect effect is restricted to the neighbouring districts because we used a binary matrix to analyse all three procedures. As can be seen in Table 4 , we observed a positive significant HHI for hip and knee replacement for the direct effect. This result suggests that the rate of hip and knee replacements rose as the market concentration increased. For hip replacement, this held only for the HHI (mean), which is the average over time and describes the variation between the districts. For knee replacement, we additionally observed this effect for the HHI (within), which represents variation over time. Furthermore, we observed a positive significant HHI (within) for the indirect effect for hip and knee replacement, which implies that the rate of hip replacements in a given district was positively associated with an increase in market concentration in neighbouring districts. As can be seen from Table 5 , we did not observe a significant effect of HHI for spine surgery.
For our variables describing the supply of health resources, we observed a significant and negative association for the density of office-based orthopaedists (mean) for all three procedures. This result suggests that variation between districts had an impact on the rate of operations. Regarding variation over time for office-based orthopaedists, we obtained a negative and significant coefficient for the rate of hip replacements and spine surgeries. In contrast, the density of general practitioners is positively associated with the rate of hip replacements for the direct and indirect effects, and with knee replacement for the indirect effect. This effect was due to variation between the districts. Spine centres were positively associated with the rate of surgical procedures. Furthermore, private ownership was positively associated with the rate of spine surgery.
For the variables controlling for morbidity, the prevalence of diagnosed diseases of the spine was not significant in the SDM. For the prevalence of diagnosed hip and knee arthritis, we observed a positive significant effect for the indirect effect and for hip replacement additionally a positive significant direct effect. Life expectancy was positively associated with the rate of hip and knee replacements for the direct effect, and with the rate of spine surgery for the indirect effect. In all cases, this effect was due to variation over time. Regarding variation between the districts, we observed a negative and significant coefficient for spine surgery and knee replacement for the indirect and direct effects, and for hip replacement for the indirect effect. Income was positively associated with the rate of spine surgery for the indirect and direct effects, and with the rate of knee replacement for indirect effect. For the direct effect, the coefficient for knee replacement changed the sign. This effect was due to variation between districts. Regarding variation over time, we observed a negative direct effect for hip replacement and a positive direct effect for spine surgery.
The spatial lag parameter ρ was significant and positive for all three procedures. This suggests that a given district was expected to have higher rates of these procedures in cases where the neighbouring districts had high rates on the average.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to analyse the association between hospital competition and the rates of certain orthopaedic surgical procedures in Germany. By applying a spatial panel model, we found that with increasing market concentration, the rates of hip and knee replacement rose. We must therefore reject our hypothesis that districts with high competitive pressure have higher rates of these surgical procedures for the direct effect which represents the effect in a given district. For the indirect effect (representing the effect of the HHI in all neighbouring districts on the surgery rates in the given district), we also observed positive association for hip and knee replacement rates and for the HHI describing variation over time.
Our results for the direct effect were not in line with those of the studies described in the introduction. However, as noted in that section, these studies differ from our analysis in several important ways: none of them used a spatial regression approach; Robinson and Luft [20] based their analysis on only one year's worth of hospital data and did not use the HHI as measure of competition; and the two German studies did not take the development of hospital groups into account. Interestingly, rerunning our analysis without any consideration of hospital groups led to the same results for knee replacement as those reported by Augurzky et al. [9] that is, non-significant coefficients. Our results for the covariates are not fully in line with the findings of the previous studies we used to support our choice of covariates. The negative association we observed between the density of office-based orthopaedists and hip replacement, knee replacement and spine surgery rates is supported by the study of Schäfer et al. [32] . Our findings for the variable income are not in concordance with the not significant results reported by Joines et al. [34] and Hawker et al. [35] . However, Joines et al. [34] consider hospitalization for lower back pain and Hawker et al. [35] the willingness to consider a total joint arthroplasty. Regarding life expectancy, we observed a positive association for rates of hip and knee replacements and spine surgery for the variation over time. In contrast, the coefficients for the variation between the districts were negative for spine surgery and knee replacement. A possible interpretation for this varying results may be that with an ageing society the rates of orthopaedic surgery rise, whereas regarding the variation between the districts, "healthier districts" (measured by the life expectancy) are associated with lower rates of orthopaedic surgery.
In summary, we found that higher operation rates were associated with a higher market concentration for hip and knee replacement for the direct and indirect effects. These effects were not influenced by patients travelling to the hospitals because our data were at the level of patient residence. A potential reason for this association may be that a few hospitals in some districts had specialized in hip and knee replacements, resulting in a higher market concentration than in other districts. This specialization process might be a result of the increase in volume as described in the introduction supported by potential cost advantages based on higher number of cases (economies of scale). This argumentation is supported by our result for spine surgery, whereby we observed a positive association between the presence of specialized spine centres and rates of spine surgery. Mergers and acquisitions might be another cause for the specialization as shared input for example through specialized clinics can lead to economies of scope [44] . This is supported by our data as the number of hospital groups decreases over time.
Our study has several important limitations. First, we calculated the HHI for hip replacement, knee replacement and spine surgery at the district level, but this might not be the appropriate geographic market, as patients can choose hospitals in other districts. Therefore, hospitals competing for patients are not necessarily reflected by district boundaries. To address this potential shortcoming, Schmid and Ulrich [29] used patient flows (looking at the contribution of different areas to the hospital volume) to determine the geographic market. However, because we relied on hospital quality reports to calculate the HHI, we had only hospital-level data at our disposal. An alternative approach is to expand the spatial level used for the analysis to avoid a possible bias through treatment commuters. To verify our results, we conducted our spatial Durbin model on the level of land planning regions. Germany is divided in 96 land planning regions which are defined by federal office of building and regional planning. Land planning regions describe an economic centre and surrounding areas under the use of commuter flows. The results of this analysis can be found in Tables 9 and 10 in the Online appendix. This analysis confirms the positive significant association between the HHI and hip and knee replacement (direct effect). Additionally, a positive effect of the HHI can be shown for spine surgery. However, for the indirect effect we observed a negative association between the HHI and hip replacement. Second, identifying hospital groups is complex. Although we examined the webpages of the hospitals, it may be that economic interpenetration is not clearly indicated on these. Third, one might argue that the category of spine surgery comprises a heterogeneous range of procedures, and that our results might be different for different subcategories. To test this possibility, we divided the category of spine surgery into 13 groups following the approach taken by Schäfer et al. [45] . For eight of these groups we obtained the same, non-significant results as for the overall category of spine surgery. For two groups ("reduction, osteosynthesis, spondylodesis" and "revision and removal of osteosynthesis equipment"), the results were similar to those we obtained for hip and knee replacement (that is, a positive coefficient for the direct or indirect effect). For the groups "exision", "replacement of interspinous spacer", and "insertion of intervertebral disc prosthesis", we observed a negative association between the rates of surgical procedures and the HHI over time.
In conclusion, our results suggest that the competitive environment in a district affects the rate of certain orthopaedic surgical procedures in that district. A recently published study by Krabbe-Alkemade et al. [46] get to similar results. However, there is limited empirical evidence on competition between hospital and volume. Most studies on the competition between hospitals concentrate on quality, costs or efficiency. Based on this research, Barros et al. [47] formulated policy implications regarding the use of competition which comprise among others the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes and the provision of quality information for patients. Measuring and reporting quality/outcomes are equally important regarding one possible explanation for our association-the specialization of hospitals in the particular surgical procedures. A specialization process accompanied with a high number of cases resulting in economies of scale and potential quality improvements should be supported. The planning of those centres could be expanded. Planning of hospitals in Germany is done by the federal states. Specialization in the form of creating a centre is formulated in several hospital plans, however, not for orthopaedic surgery.
For the planning of centres, quality standard should be determined to ensure that the best possible hospitals specialize in a certain procedure. Furthermore, concentrating services in specialized centres could lead to hospital or department closures. Such a process should be accompanied by public campaigns to inform the residents about the potential of the process. The reimbursement system for hospitals should additionally be redesigned in the way that the focus is shifted from quantity to quality. In 2016, the German government introduced quality-based reimbursement components. In a first step, service areas (among others endoprosthetic treatment as hip and knee replacement) have been determined where quality agreements will be tested [48] .
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